



















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2654 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 
• from the CESifo website:           Twww.CESifo-group.org/wpT 










Using data from more than 100 economies for the period of 1975 to 2005, we conduct an 
extensive empirical analysis of the determinants of international reserve holdings. Four 
groups of determinants, namely, traditional macro variables, financial variables, institutional 
variables, and dummy variables that control for individual economies’ characteristics are 
considered. We find that the relationship between international reserves and their 
determinants is significantly different between developed and developing economies and is 
not stable over time. The estimation results indicate that, especially during the recent period, a 
developed economy tends to hold a lower level of international reserves than a developing 
one. Furthermore, there is only limited evidence that East Asian economies including China 
and Japan are accumulating an excessive amount of international reserves. 
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The recent Asian financial crisis has rekindled considerable interest in examining the 
behavior of international reserve hoarding. The fundamental rationale for holding international 
reserves ranges from transaction demand, precautionary motives, collateral asset argument, and 
mercantilist behavior. Although numerous studies have attempted to unravel the relevance of 
these factors, the debate on the determinants of international reserves is far from settled. The 
difficulty of explicating international reserve holding behavior may be attributed to the anecdotal 
view that the role and functionality of international reserves have evolved along with 
developments in global financial markets. For instance, the holding of international reserves is 
now increasingly susceptible to capital account transactions because of the continuing financial 
globalization and innovative advancements in international capital markets. The recent financial 
crisis also signified the importance of expectations, policy credibility, and institutional structures 
in determining the adequate level of international reserves.1 
One of the unique features of the Asian financial crisis is that some economies in the 
region have been accumulating international reserves at an astonishing rate in the aftermath of 
the event. The first few years of the 21st century have witnessed an unprecedented growth of 
global international reserves – a growth rate of over 114.9% between 2000 and 2006, which was 
driven by a handful of economies. During the period, China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan 
have increased their international reserve holdings by 449%, 114%, 115%, 151% and 115%, 
respectively.2 Figure 1 presents the evolution of international reserve holdings by the world and 
some selected economies. 
The phenomenal build-up by these economies has revived research interest in the 
determinants of international reserves. Some studies focus on the buffer-stock and precautionary 
demand motivation and incorporate the crisis-induced costs of output and investment 
contractions (Aizenman et al. 2007; Lee, 2004). Dooley et al. (2005), in a series of papers, 
resurrects the mercantilist view and suggest that international reserve accumulation in East Asia 
is a consequence of export-oriented growth strategy and the absence of a well-functioning 
domestic and/or regional financial system. Aizenman and Lee (2007) empirically confirm the 
                                                 
1  Some recent studies on the recent crisis are Krugman (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999), Chang 
and Velasco (1999) and Dooley (2000). 
2  Japan, China, and Russia are the three largest holders of international reserves as of 2006. During this 
period, Russia and India increased international reserves by 933% and 286%, respectively. Some developed 
countries also experienced a sharp increase such as Australia (154.4%) and Denmark (69.9%).  
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mercantilist motivation, but find that, compared with the precautionary demand, the mercantilist 
motivation accounts for a relatively small amount of international reserve hoarding. Other 
determinants for international reserve holding considered in recent studies include short-term 
external debts, financial development, and political and institutional factors.3 
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Note: The Chinese figures do not include Hong Kong’s. 
  
The recent developments in the literature on international reserves have raised a few 
questions. For instance, to what extent do these new factors help us understand the observed 
holding of international reserves? Are these new factors complements or substitutes for the “old” 
traditional economic variables? Do these new factors explain observed holdings of international 
reserves even before they were identified in the literature? Have the determinants of international 
reserve holding changed over time? Answers to these questions should shed some insight on the 
evolution of the behavior of demand for international reserves. In addition, an empirical analysis 
should allow us to assess whether economies are holding deficient or excessive levels of 
international reserves. 
                                                 
3  See, for example, Aizenman and Marion (2001, 2003, 2004), Alfaro, et al. (2003), and Greenspan (1999). 
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To investigate these questions, we conduct an extensive empirical analysis using data 
from more than 100 economies during the period of 1975 to 2005. In designing the empirical 
architecture, we take into account of some known results in the literature. For instance, previous 
studies have documented that developed and developing economies display different demand for 
international reserves (Frenkel 1974a). Others have evidenced that the nature of the demand 
behaviors for international reserves has changed in the presence of significant historical events 
such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and oil crises (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1988; 
Frenkel, 1980; Lizondo and Mathieson 1987). Most recently, Aizenman et al. (2007) also 
identify structural changes in the Korean international reserve holding after the Asian financial 
crisis. Hence, in this study, we sort the economies into two groups, the developed and developing 
economies, and investigate the determinants of the demand for international reserves in 
non-overlapping sample periods that are partitioned by major crisis episodes. 
Following the development in the theoretical literature, we consider four groups of 
explanatory variables: traditional macro variables, financial variables, institutional variables, and 
dummy variables that control for individual economies’ characteristics. To anticipate the results, 
we confirm that the demand for international reserves of developed economies is different from 
that of developing economies. The set of (significant) explanatory variables also changes across 
different sample periods. There is evidence that the holding pattern of international reserves has 
been affected by the occurrences of the debt crisis in the 1980s, and the Tequila crisis and the 
Asian crisis in the 1990s. 
Among all the factors we considered, the propensity to import, a proxy for trade openness, 
garners the largest number of significant coefficient estimates across different specifications and 
sample periods. However, its explanatory power has been declining over time for both developed 
and developing economies. On the other hand, the explanatory power of financial variables, 
including those related to external financing, has been increasing over time. 
Our evidence suggests that, compared with developing economies, the developed 
economies enjoy a “premium” in accumulating international reserves since the early 1980s – that 
is, they could afford to hold lower levels of international reserves, ceteris paribus. Moreover, our 
estimation results present only limited evidence that East Asian economies including China and 
Japan are hoarding an excessive amount of international reserves. 
A brief review of these determinants of international reserves is given in the next section. 
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Section 3 contains the main regression results. It presents the empirical framework and discusses 
results from different sample periods and different country groups. Additional analyses are 
reported in Section 4. Specifically, we compare the patterns of international reserve holdings 
between developed and developing economies. Also, in view of the recent debate, we assess 
whether some economies are holding an excessively high level of international reserves in the 
recent period. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
2. A Brief Review on the Determinants of International reserves 
To trace theoretical developments and to facilitate comparison, we group the 
determinants of international reserves into three categories: traditional macro variables, financial 
variables, and institutional variables, Readers familiar with the effects of these variables may 
choose to proceed directly to Section 3. 
The group of traditional macro variables consists of the propensity to import, volatility of 
real export receipts, international reserve volatility, the opportunity cost of holding international 
reserves, real per capita GDP, and population. These variables have been commonly considered 
as determinants since the 1960s. In the early stage of theorization, the demand for international 
reserves is mainly attributed to the need for accommodating imbalances arising from trade 
account transactions, which are the main type of balance of payments transactions before the 
development of the modern international capital market.  
Heller (1966) argues that the demand for international reserves should be negatively 
related to the marginal propensity to import because a higher propensity to import (m) implies a 
smaller marginal cost of balance of payments adjustment (i.e., 1/m), and, thereby, a lower 
demand for international reserves. However, most empirical exercises – including Heller (1966) 
himself – use the average, and not the marginal, propensity to import. Frenkel (1974b) points out 
that the average propensity to import, i.e., the imports-to-GDP ratio, measures trade openness 
and, therefore, should have a positive effect on the demand for international reserves because of 
the precautionary holding to accommodate external shocks through trade channels. 
The role of international reserve volatility is illustrated by the buffer stock model of 
international reserves. Extending the model for cash holding, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) 
illustrate the effect of international reserve volatility in a stochastic inventory control setting. In 
some studies, the volatility of real export receipts is used as an alternative proxy for the 
5 
uncertainty of balance of payments (Kelly, 1970). 
The opportunity cost of holding international reserves, which is commonly measured by 
the difference between the local interest rate and the US interest rate, has been included in 
models that compare the costs and benefits of holding international reserves (Heller, 1966; 
Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981). The effect of the opportunity cost is quite inconspicuous in the 
empirical literature, mainly due to the difficulty in assigning a single interest rate for 
international reserve assets while accounting for their risks.4 
Following Aizenman and Marion (2003), Edison (2003), and Lane and Burke (2001), real 
per capita GDP and population are included to capture the size effect on international reserve 
holding. In view of the Baumol (1952) square-root rule for transaction demand, we expect these 
size variables to have a negative coefficient. 
The second group of explanatory variables includes money supply, external debts, and 
capital flows. The use of money in explaining the hoarding of international reserves can be dated 
back to the 1950s. Courchene and Youssef (1967), for example, appeal to the monetarist model 
of balance of payments to justify the use of money in their international reserve regression.5 
More recently, de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) argue that money stock in an 
economy is a proxy for potential capital flight by domestic residents and, therefore, can be a 
measure of the intensity of the “internal drain.”6   
The implications of external debts and capital flows on the holding of international 
reserves have received considerable attention after the Asian financial crisis. While capital 
inflows can enhance economic growth by supplementing domestic savings and/or financial 
intermediaries and improving the efficiency of domestic financial markets, a sudden capital flow 
reversal can devastate an economy, trigger a crisis, and cause significant output losses.7 
Generally, developing economies with inefficient and immature financial sectors are vulnerable 
                                                 
4 Sometimes, the difference between the yields on the US and domestic government bonds is used to capture 
the opportunity cost effect. In our exercise, due to data availability, we use the differentials between the U.S. 
Treasury bill rates and domestic lending rates. 
5  One version of the “global monetarism” argues that an increase in international reserves is driven by an 
excess demand for money, which implies a balance of payments surplus whereas a fall in international reserve 
holding is caused by an excess supply of money, which implies a balance of payments deficit (Johnson, 1958). 
6 de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) refer to the research on the Early Warning System and argue 
that the international reserves-to-M2 ratio is a reasonable measure of international reserve adequacy.  
7  Edwards (2004) analyzes the sudden stop of capital inflows and current account performance in the last 
three decades. Caballero and Panageas (2004) suggest that international reserve accumulation is not the best 
insurance against sudden stops.  
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to the adverse effect of capital reversals. Thus, it is conceived that economies with a high level of 
exposure to external financing, whether they are debts, FDI, or portfolio flows, should hold a 
high level of international reserves to reduce its vulnerability to financial crises and to boost 
confidence in their currencies (Aizenman et al., 2007; Feldstein, 1999).8  
Dooley, et al. (2005) offers an alternative view on the link between capital flows and 
international reserves. These authors argue that under the current international financial 
architecture (the “Bretton Woods II system”), emerging market economies accumulate 
international reserves to secure FDI inflows from the center country, i.e., the United States. In 
other words, the economies in the “periphery” hold international reserves to ensure importation 
of financial intermediaries from abroad. According to this view, capital inflows are positively 
correlated with holdings of international reserves. 
The effect of capital flows on international reserve accumulation, however, is not 
unambiguous. Besides the insurance motive, international reserves can be viewed as a substitute 
for external financing. In this case, an economy may hold a lower level of international reserves 
if it has secured access to international capital markets and, thus, the correlation between the two 
variables is expected to be negative.  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) note that the types, volumes, and directions of capital 
flows have changed over time. Hence, the use of an aggregate variable may not capture the 
differential effects of different types of capital flows. In the following, we examine the individual 
effects of net external liabilities (i.e., external liabilities minus assets) in debt financing, portfolio 
equity financing, and FDI, as well as their growth rates.  
 The third group of explanatory variables is institutional variables. It has been argued that 
institutional characteristics such as corruption, political stability, and capital controls affect the 
holding of international reserves. Aizenman and Marion (2003, 2004) and Alfaro et al. (2003), 
for example, show that holdings of international reserves are influenced by political uncertainty 
and corruption. Our empirical exercise includes a selected group of institutional variables 
pertaining to financial openness and political/societal conditions. 
In addition to these three groups of explanatory variables, our sample also includes four 
types of dummy variables to account for other characteristics of the economies. The first type is 
                                                 
8  In general, it is suggested to cover one year amortized value of various types of liabilities over a wide range 
of possible outcomes. The role of short-term external debts is brought to the center stage by the popular 
Greenspan-Guidotti-rule (Greenspan, 1999).  
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the exchange rate regime dummy variable.9 The common wisdom suggests that economies with 
fixed exchange rates and crawling pegs have incentives to hold international reserves to fight 
against exchange rate market pressures.10 The second type is a geographic dummy variable. Its 
inclusion is motivated by the folklore that economies in certain geographic regions such as East 
Asia tend to hoard high levels of international reserves especially after the Asian financial crisis. 
The third type is the crisis dummy variable. The variable is meant to capture the effects of a 
currency crisis, a banking crisis, or a twin crisis on hoarding of international reserves.11 The 
fourth type is an interaction variable that assumes a value of one if the economy is located in a 
region which is inflicted by a crisis. This dummy variable is included to evaluate the possible 
contagion effect of crises on international reserves accumulation. 
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Model Specifications 
In the following empirical exercise, we consider a normalized international reserve 
variable given by ,i tr = , ,/i t i tR GDP , where ,i tR  is a generic notation of economy i’s holding of 
international reserves and ,i tGDP  is economy i’s gross domestic product at time t. Both variables 
are measured in U.S. dollars. Scaling international reserves facilitates comparison across countries 
of different sizes. For brevity, we call the ratio ,i tr  international reserves. The three types of 
determinants of international reserves are denoted by ,i tX  (= , ,{ ; 1,..., })i k t xx k N=  which contains 
the traditional macro variables, ,i tY  (= , ,{ ; 1,..., }i k t yy k N= ) the financial variables, and ,i tZ  
                                                 
9  Frenkel (1980) and Flood and Marion (2002), for example, report that exchange rate arrangements have 
effects on the holding of international reserves. Lane and Burke (2001), on the other hand, find no significant 
association between exchange rate regimes and international reserves. 
10  In this study, the Reinhart-Rogoff (2002) index is used to construct the exchange rate regime dummy 
variable. Their index ranges from 1 “no separate legal tender,” to 14 “Freely falling” (with increasing flexibility of 
exchange rate movement) and is a “de facto” index in contrast to IMF’s “de jure” exchange rate regime 
classification. In this paper, we aggregate these categories into three; namely “floating,” “Crawling Peg,” and 
“Fixed/Pegged.”  
11  The currency crisis dummy variable is derived from the conventional exchange rate market pressure (EMP) 
index pioneered by Eichengreen et al. (1996). The EMP index is defined as a weighted average of monthly changes 
in the nominal exchange rate, the international reserve loss in percentage, and the nominal interest rate. The weights 
are inversely related to the pooled variance of changes in each component over the sample countries, and adjustment 
is made for the countries that experienced hyperinflation following Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For countries 
without data to compute the EMP index, the currency crisis classifications in Glick and Hutchison (2001) and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) are used. The banking crisis dummy variable is based on Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003). The twin crisis effect is examined by an interaction variable between a currency crisis and a banking crisis 
(Hutchison and Noy, 2002). 
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(= , ,{ ; 1,..., }i k t zz k N= ) the institutional variables. The dummy variables that capture other 
characteristics of the economies are collected under ,i tD  (= , ,{ ; 1,..., }i k t dd k N= ). The Appendix 
provides a complete list of variables, their definitions, their sources, and a description of their 
period averages. 
We consider cross-sectional behavior for three non-overlapping sample periods; namely 
1975-1981, 1983-1993, and 1999-2005. The sample periods exclude the years inflicted by the 
three major financial crises; the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, the 1994 Tequila crisis, and the 
1997-8 Asian financial crisis.12 For each of the three sample periods, we employ the period 
averages of ,i tr , itX , ,i tY , ,i tZ , and ,i tD  and label them ir , iX , iY , iZ , and ,iD  
respectively. The use of period averages allows us to avoid complexity that arises from unknown 
and, possibly varying dynamics, and focus on the (time-)average behavioral relationship. 
The effects of these variables on hoarding of international reserves are studied using the 
following regression equations:  
ir  = c + 
'
iX α  + iε , (1) 
ir  = c + 
'
iX α  + 'iD δ + iε , (2) 
ir  = c + 
'
iX α  + 'iY β  + 'iD δ  + iε , and  (3) 
ir  = c + 
'
iX α  + 'iY β  + 'iZ γ  + 'iD δ  + iε . (4) 
The coefficient vectors α , β , γ , and δ  are conformable to the associated explanatory 
variables. The intercept and disturbance term are given by c and iε , respectively.  
Specification (1) is an international reserve demand equation of the 1970s vintage. The 
economy characteristic dummy variables are included in specification (2). Specification (3) 
includes the financial variables ( iY ) that are often referred to in the recent discussion on the 
demand for international reserves. The effects of institutional factors ( iZ ) are examined in 
specification (4). These four specifications allow us to gauge the relative and incremental 
contributions of the different groups of explanatory variables. 
We divide the sample of 126 economies into two groups: one with 22 developed 
                                                 
12  We leave out the two years between the 1994 and 1997-98 crises since they are too short for a serious 
investigation. In subsection 3.3, we present robust test results from the samples that encompass the left-out period. 
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economies and the other with 104 developing economies. Due to data availability, the actual 
number of the economies included in the estimation varies across the three sample periods, but 
for any given sample period, it is set fixed across the four specifications to facilitate comparison.  
 
3.2 Estimation Results 
The estimation results for the developed economies are presented in Table 1-1. The 
results pertaining to the regression equations (1) to (4) are respectively presented under the 
columns labeled (1) to (4) for each of the three periods; namely 1975-1981, 1983-93, and 
1999-2005. We estimated these specifications sequentially and kept only significant variables in 
each step. Those for the developing economies are presented in the same format in Table 1-2.13 
 
3.2.1 The 1975-1981 Period 
For the developed economies, two traditional macro variables, real per capita GDP and 
the propensity to import, are found to be significant in the 1975-81 period and explain 47% of 
variations in international reserves held by the developed economies. The signs of coefficient 
estimates are consistent with those predicted in the literature. The transaction demand for 
international reserves, on a per capita basis, falls as the real per capita income level rises (Heller 
1968). The proxy for trade openness and the degree of external vulnerability given by the 
(average) propensity to import has the expected positive coefficient (Frenkel, 1974b).  
The significant 1982 crisis dummy variable indicates that, in retrospect, the developed 
economies that experienced a currency crisis in 1982 held lower levels of international reserves 
than the non-crisis economies before the event. 
The significant money effect (M2/GDP) is in accordance with the monetary interpretation 
of the balance of payments and also with the view that money supply is a proxy for internal drain 
of international reserves during the crisis period. Nonetheless, we are not sure to what extent the 
internal drain interpretation is relevant for these economies. In any case, inclusion of M2 leads to 
a noticeable increase in the adjusted R-square coefficient. 
Interestingly, for this group of economies, institutional development does not have an 
effect on the behavior of international reserves holding back in 1975-81. Thus, the specification
                                                 
13  The economies included under each of these periods are listed in the Appendix. 
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Table 1-1: Estimation Results for Developed economies; 1975 – 1981, 1983 – 1993, 1999 – 2005  
 1975 – 1981 1983 – 1993 1999 – 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Real per capita GDP -0.107 -0.13 -0.131          
 [0.057]* [0.055]** [0.039]***          
Propensity to import 0.245 0.196 0.321  0.272 0.3 0.357 0.444     
 [0.055]*** [0.065]*** [0.055]***  [0.068]*** [0.101]*** [0.080]*** [0.071]***     
Population (in log)         -0.02 -0.017 -0.017 -0.026 
         [0.007]*** [0.006]** [0.007]** [0.004]*** 
International reserve          0.009 0.007 0.007 0.01 
    volatility         [0.004]* [0.004] [0.004] [0.003]*** 
Crisis in 1982  -0.061 -0.058   -0.028 -0.049 -0.049     
  [0.037]* [0.027]**   [0.030] [0.032] [0.023]**     
Fixed/Pegged regime      -0.029 -0.063 -0.089     
      [0.038] [0.025]** [0.025]***     
Crawling peg regime          0.131 0.136 0.122 
          [0.011]*** [0.010]**
*
[0.008]*** 
M2 / GDP   0.132    0.33 0.363     
   [0.052]**    [0.056]*** [0.060]***     
Net portfolio            -0.018 -0.029 
   liabilities           [0.015] [0.012]** 
Leftist government        0.047     
        [0.018]**     
De jure capital acct.            0.055 
openness            [0.016]*** 
Constant 1.044 1.283 1.183  0.022 0.022 -0.198 -0.257 0.365 0.321 0.326 0.323 
 [0.552]* [0.547]** [0.377]***  [0.018] [0.019] [0.047]*** [0.054]*** [0.114]*** [0.098]*** [0.111]**
*
[0.040]*** 
# Observations 21 21 21  22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Adj. R-square 0.47 0.52 0.72  0.18 0.12 0.72 0.79 0.28 0.65 0.65 0.83 
NOTES: Robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels, respectively. The column 
headings (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond to the model specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4) in the text. (4) is absent under the 1999-2005 sample period 
because there is no significant institutional variables. 
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Table 1-2: Estimation Results for Developing economies, 1975 – 1981, 1983 – 1993, 1999 – 2005  
 1975 – 1981 1983 – 1993 1999 – 2005
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Propensity to import 0.314 0.342 0.349 0.105 0.329 0.332 0.344 0.329     
 [0.035]*** [0.037]*** [0.020]*** [0.058]* [0.044]*** [0.039]*** [0.037]*** [0.040]***     
International reserve      0.016 0.013 0.009 0.01     
  volatility     [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***     
Opportunity cost          -0.394 -0.364 -0.111 -0.117 
         [0.142]*** [0.127]*** [0.044]** [0.047]** 
Crisis during period  -0.072 -0.053 -0.058         
  [0.018]*** [0.014]*** [0.014]***         
Banking crisis in 1982      0.05 0.049 0.05     
      [0.017]*** [0.017]*** [0.017]***     
Latin America           -0.091 -0.073 -0.077 
             [0.029]*** [0.022]*** [0.023]*** 
Fixed/Pegged regime          -0.021 -0.037 -0.05 
          [0.047] [0.024] [0.027]* 
Net debt liabilities   -0.204 -0.433   -0.059 -0.06     
   [0.056]*** [0.056]***   [0.022]*** [0.021]***     
Creditor x Net debt       0.055 0.06     
liabilities       [0.029]* [0.029]**     
Growth in net       0.359 0.358     
debt liabilities       [0.197]* [0.197]*     
M2 / GDP           0.203 0.201 
           [0.029]*** [0.029]*** 
Net portfolio            -0.701 -0.717 
liabilities           [0.045]*** [0.049]*** 
Anti-corruption    -0.014         
    [0.005]**         
De facto capital acct.     0.262    0.002     
openness    [0.057]***    [0.001]**     
Leftist-government            -0.065 
            [0.027]** 
Constant -0.005 0.007 0.061 0.072 -0.028 -0.036 -0.011 -0.01 0.268 0.292 0.142 0.164 
 [0.014] [0.015] [0.021]*** [0.016]*** [0.015]* [0.013]*** [0.015] [0.016] [0.035]*** [0.044]*** [0.034]*** [0.040]*** 
# Observations 53 53 53 53 80 80 80 80 76 76 76 76 
Adj. R-square 0.49 0.57 0.69 0.85 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.71 0.1 0.13 0.61 0.63 
NOTES: Robust standard errors are given in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%; 5%; and 1% levels, respectively. The column 
headings (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond to the model specifications (1), (2), (3), and (4) in the text. (4) is absent under the 1999-2005 sample period 
because there is no significant institutional variables. 
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(4) is omitted for this sample period. 
For the developing economies (Table 1-2), the propensity to import again enters 
significantly with the expected sign. However, that is the only macroeconomic variable that 
enters the estimation significantly although it alone explains 49% of the variability of 
international reserve holdings. The result signifies the importance of trade account transactions 
for these economies. 
The experience of a currency crisis during the period is found to be associated with a fall 
in the holding of international reserves.14 As the first generation crisis model predicts (Krugman, 
1979; Flood and Garber, 1984), currency crises involve severe reductions in international 
reserves holding. 
The ratio of net debt liabilities to GDP is the only significant financial variable for 
developing economies in this period. Neither the growth rate of net debt liabilities, nor the ratio 
of short-term external debts to GDP is found to be significant, suggesting that the level of 
external debts, but not its growth rate or its maturity structure, matters. The negative coefficient 
on net debt liabilities indicates that net borrowers tend to hold lower levels of international 
reserves.15 The evidence suggests that international reserves and external debts can be viewed as 
substitutes. Another possible interpretation is that higher levels of external debts increase the 
default risk and thus, lead to capital outflow and a drawdown of international reserves. 
Unfortunately, we are not able to disentangle these two interpretations.16  
Two institutional variables, the indexes for corruption and de facto financial openness, 
are found to be significant. The effect of corruption on the holding of international reserves is 
different from the one reported in Aizenman and Marion (2003, 2004).17 A higher value of our 
corruption index means an environment less favorable to corruption. Our results indicate that a 
less corrupt economy holds a lower level of international reserves. A likely interpretation is that 
an economy with a good reputation of having less corruption would need fewer international 
                                                 
14  The “Dummy for crisis during the period” assigns a value of unity to economies that experienced a crisis 
during the 1975-81 period and, therefore, is different from the 1982 crisis dummy variable.  
15  Positive (Negative) net external financial liabilities correspond to net receivers (providers) of external 
finances. 
16  The use of the ratio of external debts to GDP from the World Bank/BIS/OECD dataset on external debts 
gives qualitatively similar results. In the text, we report results pertaining to the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) 
dataset because it offers a better coverage than the World Bank/BIS/OECD dataset. 
17  To be exact, Aizenman and Marion focused on political corruption, which may have a different implication 
for the holding of international reserves.  
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reserves to demonstrate its fundamental soundness. 
It is interesting to find that financial openness (measured by the ratio of total cross-border 
capital flows to GDP) and international reserve holding are positively related. The result mirrors 
the recently advanced view that, to preempt potential capital flight, developing economies need 
to hold more international reserves when they are financially integrated with the global market. 
Our results suggest that developing economies in 1975-1981 already held international reserves 
in a way consistent with this type of precautionary motivation. 
 
3.2.2 The 1983-1993 Period 
For the developed economies in the 1983-1993 period (Table 1-1), the propensity to 
import is the only significant macro variable. Its coefficient estimates are generally larger than 
the ones in the previous sample period. Nevertheless, the variable explains a much smaller 
proportion of international reserve variation than the two macro variables did in the previous 
period. 
Interestingly, economies with a fixed or peg exchange rate regime tend to hold fewer 
international reserves. The result follows from either a credible peg with sound economic 
conditions or the tendency to intervene under a non-pegged arrangement. It is likely that both 
reasons contribute to the observed result for the developed economies. 
As it did in the previous sample period, the 1982 crisis dummy variable has negative 
estimates. Even though not all of them are significant, these crisis-inflicted economies tend to 
hold lower levels of international reserves.  
The M2 variable continues to be the only significant financial variable for this group of 
economies while its coefficient estimates are slightly larger than those in the previous period. 
More importantly, inclusion of this variable improves the goodness of fit dramatically. 
Among the institutional variables, the dummy variable for the economies with a leftist 
government enters significantly; developed economies with leftist governments hold more 
international reserves. This finding appears contradictory to the common belief that a leftist 
government tends to spend more and incur current account deficits, and thereby leads to a lower 
level of international reserves (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). Nonetheless, the argument is possibly 
more relevant to developing economies than developed ones since the former has limited access 
to international financing. 
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Again, developing economies are also found to be driven by a different set of 
determinants in this period (Table 1-2). In this period, not just the propensity to import, but also 
international reserve volatility enters significantly. These two macroeconomic variables account 
for a large proportion (63%) of cross-economy international reserve variability.  
While there is no sign of a currency crisis effect, the experience of a banking crisis in 
1982 is associated with an increase in the hoarding of international reserves. That is, in the 
aftermath of a banking crisis, the crisis-inflicted economy tends to increase its holding of 
international reserves. The finding is different from the crisis effect noted for developed 
economies in Table 1.1. 
For this sample period, the data from developing economies allow us to discriminate the 
behaviors between net creditors and net debtors.18 That is, net debtor economies may have an 
incentive to hold more or fewer international reserves, depending on whether they perceive 
international reserves an insurance or a substitute to external finances. Net creditor developing 
economies, on the other hand, would not have such incentives. To this end, we create a dummy 
variable for net creditor economies (i.e., those with negative net debt liabilities) and interact it 
with the net debt liabilities variable. The effects of these variables are reported in columns (7) 
and (8). 
The results suggest that, for the net debtor developing economies, the level of 
international reserves is inversely related to the amount of net liabilities; international reserves 
and external debts are substitutes. The coefficient estimate, however, is much smaller compared 
to the one from the previous sample period. Net creditor economies, on the other hand, appear to 
be unresponsive to net debt liabilities; the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is about 
the same magnitude as that of the level term with an opposite sign, indicating an essentially zero 
coefficient.  
Besides their level, the growth of net debt liabilities is found to be a significant 
determinant; the faster the net liabilities increase, the more international reserves the developing 
economy would build up.19 According to the coefficient estimates, the net debt liabilities effect 
is much weaker than its growth effect. Thus, on the margin, a rise in net debt liabilities will lead 
to an increase in the holding of international reserves, which can be served as implicit collaterals.  
                                                 
18  In the 1975-1981 sample, there is no creditor developing economy.  
19  The variable for the growth of net debt liabilities was also interacted with the creditor dummy variable. 
However, the interaction term was found to be insignificant.  
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Among the institutional variables, only the de facto capital account openness remains to 
be a significant determinant – however, its magnitude is now much smaller.  
 
3.2.3 The 1999-2005 Period 
Population and international reserve volatility are the two significant macro determinants 
for the developed economies in the post-Asian financial crisis period (Table 1-1). The two 
variables have expected effects on the holdings of international reserves. Compared with real per 
capita GDP, population captures another dimension of the size effect. The negative estimates are 
in accordance with the perceived wisdom that the larger the population size, the smaller the (per 
capita) demand for international reserves would be. Also, the positive effect of international 
reserve volatility is consistent with the model of, say, Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981).20 In passing, 
we can note that a) the propensity to import is no longer a significant explanatory variable in this 
period, and that b) compared with macro variables in the two previous periods, these two macro 
variables have a fairly low explanatory power. 
The crawling peg dummy variable is the only significant characteristics dummy variable. 
The positivity of its coefficient estimate is supportive of the “unstable middle” hypothesis, which 
asserts that crawling peg regimes are more prone to currency crises than flexible or fixed 
exchange rate regimes (Willett, 2003). The idea is that economies with crawling pegged 
exchange rates, and difficulties in establishing credibility, have to hold a higher level of 
international reserves to maintain their exchange rate regimes. 
Among the financial variables, M2 (relative to GDP) is no longer significant in this 
period. Instead, the net value of portfolio liabilities is a significantly negative determinant. The 
negative sign suggests that these economies regard international reserves and portfolio flows as 
substitutes. The substitutability appears to be a debtor economy’s phenomenon because the 
dummy variable for the creditor economies, those which provide portfolio financing, is not found 
to be significant. 
 The relevance of financial openness is confirmed by the significance of the Chinn-Ito 
index reported in column (4).21 Its positive coefficient estimate underlines the precautionary 
                                                 
20  A dummy variable was constructed for Japan’s international reserve volatility, which is an extreme outlier.  
21  A larger value of this measure means a higher level of capital account openness. The index is a reciprocal 
of regulatory restrictions on cross-border financial transactions and is based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration 
reported in Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). See Chinn and Ito 
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motive to guard against adverse capital flows under an open capital account regime. The finding 
appears consistent with the recent trend of financial globalization.  
 Interestingly, similar to the case of developed economies, the propensity to import 
variable is also found to be insignificant for developing economies (Table 1-2) in the post-Asian 
financial crisis period. The disappearance of the significant propensity to import effect seems not 
to be an isolated instance. The result can be attributed to the shift of attention from trade to 
financial (and structural) factors occurring in the aftermath of the crisis. More data are required 
to assess if the absence of the propensity to import effect is a transitory or a permanent 
phenomenon. 
The opportunity cost of holding international reserves is now the only significant macro 
variable – a high opportunity cost discourages the hoarding of international reserves. However, it 
is not clear why the cost consideration only shows up in the recent period estimation. The 
deterioration of the effect of macro variables is reflected by adjusted R-square estimates. The 
macro variable in the 1999-2005 period explains only 10% of the variations in international 
reserve holdings; the lowest among the 12 cases presented in Table 1-2. 
 The economies in Latin America and those with pegged or fixed exchange rate systems 
tend to hold less international reserves.22 Among the financial variables, the M2 and the ratio of 
net portfolio liabilities are significant. It is the first time the M2 effect is detected for developing 
economies. The finding echoes the recent interpretation that money stock can be a measure of 
internal drain (de Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001). The estimated effect of net portfolio 
liabilities in Table 1-2 is qualitatively similar to the one for developed economies, but is larger in 
magnitude.23 The result suggests that external equity financing for developing has a larger effect 
than for developed economies. 
 The significant institutional variable in this sample period is different from those in other 
periods in Table 1-2. During the 1999-2005 period, the developing economies with a leftist 
government tend to hold less international reserves. Recall that developed economies with a 
leftist government in the 1983 – 93 period tend to hold more international reserves (Table 1-1). 
As noted in the previous subsection, a negative coefficient estimate is in accordance with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2008) for a detailed discussion. The index is viewed as a de jure index on capital account openness. 
22  The result pertaining to the Latin American economies is not driven by the crisis experienced by, say, 
Argentina in this period. The negative effect remains when countries like Argentina and Brazil are dummied out.  
23  The interaction with the dummy variable for creditor countries is found to be insignificant.  
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belief that a leftist government is with a lower level of international reserves because it tends to 
have large fiscal expenses and current account deficits (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). Once again, 
our results reveal the differences in the behaviors of developed and developing economies. 
 
3.3 Discussions 
3.3.1 Varying Explanatory Power 
The estimation results show that the determinants of international reserve holding are 
different between developed and developing economies and vary quite substantially across 
different periods. The propensity to import is the variable that shows up with most significant 
coefficient estimates for both developed and developing economies. However, its effect virtually 
disappears in the post-Asian financial crisis period. Further, there is a discernable change in the 
coefficient estimates of the propensity to import variable across different model specifications 
and sample periods. 










Macro Charac. Dummies Financial Institutional
Macro 0.47 0.18 0.28 0.49 0.63 0.10 
Charac. Dummies 0.05 -0.06 0.37 0.08 0.04 0.03 
Financial 0.20 0.60 0.00 0.12 0.04 0.48 
Institutional 0.09 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.02 
1975-81 1983-93 1999-2005 1975-81 1983-93 1999-2005
Developed Economies Developing Economies
 
The explanatory power of these factors is not stable over time either. Figure 2 presents 
the incremental contributions of the four groups of explanatory variables implied by adjusted 
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R-square estimates. That is, the bars in the figure show the incremental change in the adjusted 
R-square estimate when a group of explanatory variables is sequentially added to the estimation. 
A few observations stand out. 
First, in the 30-year span, the group of macro variables displays the most significant drop 
in explanatory power. Its contributions to the adjusted R-square estimate fall from 47% in the 
1975-1981 period to 28% in the 1999-2005 period for the developed economies and from 63% in 
the 1983 – 93 period to merely 10% in the last period for the developing economies. The fact that 
the group of significant macro variables changes across periods makes it difficult to track the 
evolution of a variable’s impact. Nonetheless, the results tend to support the notion that the 
propensity to import effect is declining over time. 
Second, for the developing economies, the incremental explanatory power of the 
financial variables increases rapidly to the level of 48% in the 1999-2005 period. The result 
reflects the growing importance of capital and financial transactions amid the continuing 
financial liberalization and globalization for developing economies. The developed economies, 
on the other hand, see the incremental explanatory power of the financial variables reaches its 
top level of 60% in the 1983-1993 period and then drops to zero after the Asian financial crisis. 
Thus, after the crisis, the financial factors are more relevant for a developing economy’s demand 
for international reserves than for a developed economy. Apparently, for both groups of 
economies, the importance of financial variables is growing at the expense of the group of macro 
variables. 
Third, the results do not give a clear trend for the role of the characteristics dummies and 
institutional variables. In the case of the developed economies, the institutional factors appear to 
be gaining importance over the last two periods, whereas the opposite seems to hold for the 
developing economies. In general, the role of institutional factors is minimal. 
The role of financial and institutional factors deserves some comments. Until recently, the 
literature has not paid much attention to the implications of financial and institutional factors. 
Nevertheless, the effects of these two types of factors are found in the 1970s and 1980s samples. 
Our results, however, should not be interpreted as strong evidence of the effect of a specific 
financial or institutional factor. Indeed, we do not find a variable that shows up consistently in all 
three periods under investigation. The effects of the significant financial and institutional 
variables vary quite substantially across specifications. For example, the M2 effect is detected for 
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developed economies in the first two sample periods but is only found for developing economies 
in the most recent period. 
 
3.3.2 Parameter Stability 
The variability of model specifications and coefficient estimates across sample periods 
and economy groups is quite transparent in Tables 1-1 and 1-2. To verify it formally, we examine 
parameter stability using the Wald test. Specifically, we pool the data from two sample periods, 
include variables that are significant in either one of the periods, and test whether the parameters 
are constant over the combined sample period. The period pairs considered are 1975 – 1981 vs. 
1983 – 1993, 1975 – 1981 vs. 1999-2005, and 1983 – 1993 vs. 1999-2005. The procedure is 
applied to both the developed and developing economies. Also, we test the parameter stability for 
each of the four groups of explanatory variables. 
The Wald test results confirm that the coefficient estimates are significantly different 
across any two sample periods.24 The evidence lends support to the view that economies alter 
their international reserve holding behaviors before and after major global financial disturbances. 
One potential issue with our choice of the sample periods is that there is a five-year gap 
between the 1983-1993 and 1999-2005 samples. With the current setting, it is not clear whether 
it is the 1994 Tequila crisis or the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis that causes the change in the 
international reserve hoarding behavior in the 1990s. To further investigate the underlying reason 
of coefficient instability, we test parameter constancy over the two periods 1983-1993 and 
1995-2005 that are separated by the 1994 Tequila crisis, as well as that over the 1983-1996 and 
1999-2005 periods separated by the Asian financial crisis.  
The Wald test results show that, for both developed and developing economies, the 
coefficient estimates are significantly different before and after both the Tequila and Asian 
financial crises. These findings corroborate our choice of the three sample periods.  
 
4. Additional Analyses 
4.1 Does it Matter if an Economy Is a Developed or Developing One? 
What would happen if a developed economy accumulates international reserves as if it 
were a developing economy, or vice versa? Let the estimated demand for international reserves 
                                                 
24  For brevity, the Wald test results are not reported here, but are available from the authors. 
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of developing economies be 
,i dpr  = cˆdp + , 'i dpW ˆdpα  + ,iˆ dpε ≡ ,iˆ dpr  + ,iˆ dpε , (5) 
and that of developed economies be 
,i ddr  = cˆdd + , 'i ddW ˆddα  + ,iˆ ddε ≡ ,iˆ ddr  + ,iˆ ddε , (6) 
where “^” indicates a parameter estimate; the subscripts “dp” and “dd” denote developing and 
developed economies; ,i dpW  contains the significant factors; ˆdpα  is the vector containing the 
corresponding estimates; and ,iˆ dpr  is the predicted level of international reserves. ,i ddW , ˆddα , 
and ,iˆ ddr  are similarly defined. 
Suppose a developed economy behaves like a developing economy, what would be its 
predicted level of international reserves? One way to address this question is to generate the 
“predicted” level of international reserves for this economy by applying its data to equation (5), 
which is estimated from the data of developing economies. We label this predicted value ,i ddr . 
By comparing ,iˆ ddr  with ,i ddr , one can assess the value (or cost) of being labeled as a developed 
economy. Similarly, we can generate ,i dpr  for a developing economy using equation (6) and data 
from the developing economies. Again, we can infer from ,iˆ dpr  and ,i dpr  the implications of a 
developing economy label. 
First, we consider the case of a developing economy that behaves like a developed 
economy and generate ,i dpr  and ,iˆ dpr  for all four regression specifications (1) to (4). For brevity, 
the discussion in this and the following subsection are based on results pertaining to specification 
(4), which includes all four types of explanatory variables. Subsample averages are used in place 
of missing values. 
Figure 3 presents three values of international reserves (as a ratio to GDP) for each 
economy: actual levels of international reserves (ri,dp); predicted values from the fitted equation 
for the developing economies sample ( ,iˆ dpr ) – which we call the “simple” predictions for 
simplicity; and predicted values from the fitted equation for the developed economies ( ,i dpr ) – 
which we call the “cross” predictions. In the figure, the economies are sorted in descending order 
(from the left to the right) according to their real per capita GDP in U.S. dollars. 
As expected, the simple predictions ( ,iˆ dpr ) match the actual values of international 
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reserves (ri,dp) quite well. The distribution of the cross predictions ( ,i dpr ), on the other hand, 
depends on the sample period. 
 
Figure 3: Developing Economies Behave as if They were Developed Economies 
 































































































































































































































       Actual levels of international reserves 
       Simple predicted values from the models of developing economies 
       Cross predicted values from the models of developed economies 
 
In the 1975 – 1981 sample (Panel A), the cross prediction values ( ,i dpr ) appear 
consistently above the simple prediction values ( ,iˆ dpr ). Also, the gap between ,iˆ dpr  and ,i dpr  
diverges as the level of real per capita income declines. Based on the estimation results in Tables 
1-1 and 1-2, we can conjecture that the observed divergence is driven by the negative real output 
(per capita) effect found for developed economies in this period. The negative income effect may 
reflect the unfavorable conditions faced by low income economies in the international financial 
market in the 1970s. Thus, if developing economies were viewed as developed economies in the 
late 1970s, these economies, especially those with low per capita income, would have been 
required to hold higher levels of international reserves. 
For the 1983 – 1993 and 1999-2005 periods, the cross predictions ( ,i dpr ) are quite often 
lower than the corresponding simple predictions ( ,iˆ dpr ). During these two sample periods, if 
developing economies could behave as developed ones, they would hold lower levels of 
international reserves. That is, compared with developed economies with similar economic and 
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financial conditions, developing economies tend to hold more international reserves. The result 
suggests that there are some “intrinsic” differences between developed and developing 
economies that are not captured by the explanatory variables considered in the current exercise. 
These uncaptured features may include differences in their accessibilities to international 
financial markets and vulnerabilities to crises. Unfortunately, we do not have variables to 
account for these differences. 
Admittedly, it is quite difficult to decipher the numerical values of international reserves 
from Figure 3. Table 2 reports the actual values and the two types of predicted values of 
international reserves for some Asian economies, the ones that are often perceived to hold an 
excessive amount of international reserves, as well as some selected subgroups. In Table 2, 
positive values in column (3) mean that a developing economy has a level of international 
reserves higher than the simple predicted value ( 0ˆ,, >− dpidpi rr ) whereas those in column (5) 
mean that the economy has a level of international reserves higher than the one implied by cross 
prediction ( 0~,, >− dpidpi rr ). Column (6) reports the differences between the two predicted values, 
dpidpi rr ,, ~ˆ − . In general, Table 2 confirms the observations we made with Figure 3.   
It is worthwhile noting that the relative magnitudes of the differences in the two types of 
predicted values of international reserves vary across sample periods. For example, during the 
1983 – 1993 period, the Latin America group gives the largest difference between the two 
predicted values (column (6)) while the emerging Asian group yields the smallest. However, 
during the 1999-2005 period, the opposite is true for the two groups. 
Furthermore, the discrepancies between the two kinds of predictions vary substantially 
across the economies. In the 1999-2005 sample, the actual levels of international reserves held 
by Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are much higher than the cross predictions. 
Singapore is an extreme case – the economy’s actual level of international reserves is slightly 
lower than the simple predicted value, but is higher than the cross prediction by 75.0%! Thus, if 
the criteria of the developed economies are used to assess adequacy, these developing economies 
would be deemed to have an excessive level of international reserves. 
Another interesting case is China. During the 1999-2005 sample period, China’s holding 
of international reserves is 10.7% lower than the simple predicted value. The degree of 
deficiency increases to 144.7% when the cross prediction is used as a reference point! That is, 
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Table 2: Developing Economies Behave as if They were Developed Economies 
 Actual 
Estimates based on 
developing economy 
equations, ,iˆ dpr  
Errors 




equations, ,i dpr  
Errors 
(1) - (4) 
Differences 
(2) - (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1.   1975 - 1981    
Indonesia 5.6% 7.2% -1.6% 50.1% -44.5% -42.9% 
Korea 5.3% 7.4% -2.1% 28.4% -23.1% -21.0% 
Malaysia 21.3% 19.6% 1.7% 39.7% -18.3% -20.0% 
Philippines 9.8% 12.0% -2.1% 40.1% -30.2% -28.1% 
Singapore 58.3% 56.2% 2.1% 64.7% -6.4% -8.5% 
Thailand 10.9% 8.1% 2.8% 45.5% -34.7% -37.4% 
The whole group 8.0% 9.4% -1.4% 29.3% -21.3% -19.9% 
Emerging Asia 10.7% 11.5% -0.8% 42.2% -31.4% -30.7% 
Latin America 7.7% 7.0% 0.7% 14.4% -6.8% -7.4% 
Oil Countries 17.9% 16.8% 1.1% 32.3% -14.4% -15.5% 
2.   1983-1993       
China 7.8% 11.7% -3.9% 11.7% -3.9% 0.0% 
Indonesia 7.3% 6.5% 0.8% -4.1% 11.4% 10.6% 
Korea 4.5% 11.0% -6.5% 0.7% 3.8% 10.3% 
Malaysia 23.8% 20.4% 3.4% 35.7% -12.0% -15.4% 
Philippines 6.5% 11.1% -4.6% -1.0% 7.5% 12.1% 
Singapore 70.9% 62.8% 8.1% 73.4% -2.5% -10.6% 
Thailand 12.8% 13.7% -0.9% 5.8% 6.9% 7.9% 
The whole group 8.4% 9.5% -1.0% -1.4% 9.9% 10.9% 
Emerging Asia 12.2% 14.4% -2.2% 7.6% 4.5% 6.7% 
Latin America 6.7% 7.1% -0.4% -15.7% 22.4% 22.7% 
Oil Countries 16.0% 13.3% 2.7% 3.3% 12.7% 10.0% 
3.   1999-2005       
China 23.0% 33.7% -10.7% 167.8% -144.7% -134.0% 
Hong Kong 68.1% 61.5% 6.7% 13.8% 54.4% 47.7% 
Indonesia 16.0% 19.1% -3.1% -8.0% 24.0% 27.2% 
Korea 22.9% 20.6% 2.3% 20.7% 2.3% 0.0% 
Malaysia 41.9% 26.1% 15.7% 0.9% 41.0% 25.3% 
Philippines 20.0% 24.4% -4.4% -12.3% 32.3% 36.7% 
Singapore 95.9% 97.1% -1.2% 20.8% 75.0% 76.3% 
Thailand 29.2% 30.2% -1.0% -9.0% 38.1% 39.1% 
The whole group 20.0% 22.0% -2.0% 37.3% -17.3% -15.3% 
Emerging Asia 34.9% 32.8% 2.1% 9.4% 25.6% 23.4% 
Latin America 9.8% 7.2% 2.6% -3.4% 13.2% 10.6% 
Oil Countries 29.1% 21.8% 7.3% 4.7% 24.4% 17.1% 
NOTES: Due to data availability, China is not included in the 1975-81 sample, and Hong Kong is not in 
the 1975-81 and 1983-93 samples. The “Emerging Asia” group does not include China. The subsample 
average is a real US dollar GDP weighted average. Therefore, the prediction errors for “The whole group” 
in columns (3) are not necessarily zero. A positive (negative) error in columns (3) and (5) indicates 
over(under)-hoarding of international reserves relative to model predictions. 
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both specifications for developing or developed economies suggest that China’s holding of 
international reserves should have been higher between 1999 and 2005. 
 Next, we repeat the exercise for the group of developed economies and present the results 
in Figure 4 and Table 3. The panels in Figure 4 show that, generally, the simple prediction values 
are lower than the cross prediction ones; if a developed economy were treated as a developing 
economy, it would have to hold a higher level of international reserves – a result consistent with 
the previous analysis. Comparing the graphs from the three sample periods, the discrepancy 
between the two kinds of predicted values is the smallest during the second period. 
 
 
Figure 4: Developed Economies Behave as if They were Developing Economies 
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       Actual level of international reserves 
       Simple predicted values from the models of developed economies 
       Cross predicted values from the models of developing economies 
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Table 3 confirms that the group of developed economies holds a level of international 
reserves much lower than what is predicted by the fitted model for developing economies. 
Interestingly, Japan, one of the largest holders of international reserves, is deemed to have too 
few international reserves during the 1999-2005 period; its average level of international reserves 
is 12.6% (of its GDP), but the cross prediction indicates that the ratio should be 55.3%. 
 











equations, ddir ,~  
Errors 
(1) - (4) 
Differences 
(2) - (4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1.      1975 - 1981   
U.K. 5.6% 5.1% 0.5% 44.2% -38.6% -39.0% 
Germany 10.3% 6.8% 3.5% 18.6% -8.3% -11.8% 
Japan 3.4% 9.2% -5.8% 7.9% -4.5% 1.3% 
Average of developed 
economies  6.6% 5.0% 1.6% 14.2% -7.6% -9.2% 
2.      1983 - 1993       
U.K. 4.8% 10.2% -5.4% 16.8% -12.0% -6.6% 
Germany 8.0% 7.1% 0.9% 15.1% -7.1% -8.0% 
Japan 2.8% 2.8% 0.0% 19.3% -16.4% -16.4% 
Average of developed 
economies 5.4% 6.6% -1.2% 14.8% -9.4% -8.2% 
3.      1999-2005       
U.K. 2.5% 2.6% -0.1% 24.8% -22.4% -22.3% 
Germany 4.1% 5.7% -1.6% 25.9% -21.7% -20.2% 
Japan 12.6% 12.6% 0.0% 55.3% -42.6% -42.6% 
Average of developed 
economies 4.9% 4.9% 0.1% 32.6% -27.7% -27.7% 
NOTES: The average is a real US dollar GDP weighted average. Therefore, the prediction errors for 
“Average of developed economies” in columns (3) are not necessarily zero. A positive (negative) error 
in columns (3) and (5) indicates over- (under-) hoarding of international reserves relative to model 
predictions. 
 
4.2 Over- or Under-Hoarding of International Reserves? 
As we stated in the introduction, the recent phenomenal buildup of international reserves 
by some developing economies has triggered a contentious debate about whether these 
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economies are holding an excessive amount of international reserves and, thus, posing a serious 
threat to the stability of the world economy. One traditional rule of thumb indicator of excessive 
international reserves holding is whether a country holds international reserves worth more than 
three months of imports. As of the end of 2006, the amount of international reserves held by 
China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan is worth 16.16, 18.22, 9.24, 5.00, and 15.75 months 
of imports, respectively, which is well above the three-month benchmark. 
Our analysis, however, has shown that imports are just one of the determinants of the 
hoarding behavior. Furthermore, the importance of the propensity to import has been declining 
over years. Hence, the assessment of the adequacy of international reserves should go beyond the 
consideration of imports. There are additional complexities. For instance, our results in the 
previous section suggest that the holding pattern of international reserves has evolved over time. 
There is also evidence that, under similar conditions, developing economies tend to hold a level 
of international reserves higher than developed economies. 
To shed more light on the issue of excessive hoarding in recent years, we generate the 
1999-2005 predictions from the empirical equations of international reserves obtained in 
different sample periods. For example, the predicted values for developed economies are made 
by applying the 1999-2005 data to the fitted equations of developed economies in each of the 
three sample periods. The results are presented in Table 4. Columns (1) to (3) in the table are the 
same as the corresponding entries in columns (1) to (3) of Panel 3 in Tables 2 and 3 – they are 
included for comparison purposes. Columns (4) and (6) list the 1999-2005 predicted values 
generated from fitted models of the 1983-93 and the 1975-81 periods, respectively. Columns (5) 
and (7) are the prediction errors for columns (4) and (6), respectively.  
When the 1999-2005 specifications are used, there is no substantial evidence of 
over-hoarding of international reserves. Among the selected Asian economies shown in Table 4, 
Malaysia has the highest level of over-hoarding – the excessive amount is more than one half of 
its predicted value. China, on the other hand, has the highest deficient rate of 10.7%. Compared 
with developing economies, the developed economies display a lower degree of over-hoarding 
variability.  
The use of the 1975 – 1981 and 1983 – 1993 models presents a different picture. In 
general, the actual holdings are lower than the values predicted by these two models. For 
developed economies, Japan is the only case that gives an over-hoarding result. Both the U.K.
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Table 4: Predicted Values of the 1999-2005 International reserves from Different Model Vintages 
 Actual 
Estimates based 
on the 1999-05 
Model 
Errors  
(1) - (2) 
Estimates based 
on the 1983-93 
Model 
Errors  
(1) - (4) 
Estimates based 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1.        Developed Economies       
U.K. 2.5% 2.6% -0.1% 34.2% -31.8% 10.3% -7.8%
Germany 4.1% 5.7% -1.6% 10.5% -6.4% 6.2% -2.1%
Japan 12.6% 12.6% 0.0% 7.8% 4.8% 12.1% 0.5%
Average of developed economies 4.9% 4.9% 0.1% 11.3% -6.4% 3.5% 1.4%
2.       Developing Economies       
China 23.0% 33.7% -10.7% 201.5% -178.5% 33.7% -10.7%
Hong Kong 68.1% 61.5% 6.7% 59.1% 9.1% 398.7% -330.5%
Indonesia 16.0% 19.1% -3.1% 5.8% 10.2% 3.7% 12.3%
Korea 22.9% 20.6% 2.3% 49.7% -26.8% 20.3% 2.7%
Malaysia 41.9% 26.1% 15.7% 46.2% -4.3% 51.2% -9.3%
Philippines 20.0% 24.4% -4.4% 18.9% 1.1% 15.4% 4.6%
Singapore 95.9% 97.1% -1.2% 57.2% 38.6% 273.9% -178.0%
Thailand 29.2% 30.2% -1.0% 23.5% 5.7% 24.7% 4.5%
Average of developing economies 20.0% 22.0% -2.0% 60.9% -40.9% 40.2% -20.2%
Emerging Asia 34.9% 32.8% 2.1% 40.7% -5.8% 87.2% -52.3%
Latin America 9.8% 7.2% 2.6% 14.6% -4.8% 23.6% -13.8%
Oil Countries 29.1% 21.8% 7.3% 12.7% 16.4% 37.7% -8.6%
NOTES: The (subsample) averages real US dollar GDP weighted averages and thus are not necessarily zeros. A positive (negative) error in 




and Germany are deemed to hold too few international reserves in the period. Indeed, Japan 
shows a relatively minor change in its estimated over- and under-hoarding positions.  
The results for developing economies are quite striking. The predicted values show a high 
degree of variation. For instance, the 1983 – 1993 specification suggest Singapore holds the most 
“excessive” amount of international reserves (38.6%) and China’s level of international reserves 
is lower than the model prediction by a stunning 178.5%. Under the 1975-1981 model, the 
Philippines over-hoards by 4.6% while Hong Kong under-hoards by 330.5%. 
According to the 1983 – 1993 specification, the group of developing economies on 
average has a deficient amount of international reserves; the actual average holding is 6.4% less 
than the predicted value. The group of oil exporting economies has the highest level of excessive 
holding (16.4%) among the subgroups. 
The 1975 – 1981 specification gives an even more severe under-hoarding scenario. 
According to this vintage model, developing economies are under-hoarding on average by an 
amount of 52.3%. All of the three geographical subgroups hold lower levels of international 
reserves than the model predictions. For individual economies, China, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore are the three economies that have the largest degrees of under-hoarding – for Hong 
Kong and Singapore, the size of international reserves holding is expected to be bigger than their 
GDPs! 
In sum, the evidence for excessive holdings of international reserves in the 2000s is quite 
limited. Indeed, according to the models of the 1970s and 1980s, these selected economies tend 
to hold a deficient, instead of an excessive, amount of international reserves. These findings 
suggest that, in assessing the adequacy of international reserves, one has to take into account of 
both the changing global environment and the evolving role of international reserves. 
  
5. Concluding Remarks 
 Against the backdrop of the astonishing growth of global international reserves and the 
recent advancements in modeling the demand for international reserves, we conduct an extensive 
cross-country analysis to examine the empirical determinants of international reserve holding. 
Four groups of determinants, namely, traditional macro variables, financial variables, 
institutional variables, and dummy variables that control for individual economy characteristics 
are considered. Also, accounting for the anecdotal evidence that major currency crises affect the 
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demand for international reserves, we examined three sample periods partitioned by three major 
crisis episodes, the 1982 Mexican debt crisis, the 1994 Tequila crisis, and the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. 
It is found that the empirical specifications of the demand for international reserves differ 
between developed and developing economies and across the three sample periods. Indeed, the 
set of significant explanatory variables changes quite substantially across specifications. The 
propensity to import variable has the highest frequency of significant coefficient estimates but its 
effect appears to be declining over time. Formal Wald statistics confirm parameter non-constancy 
and corroborate our choice of sample periods. All in all, the empirical results highlight the 
difficulty of devising a single empirical model to describe the holding of international reserves. 
They also represent some challenges for building a unified theory of demand for international 
reserves. 
Besides the changing nature of the estimated relationship, we find that the effects of 
financial and institutional factors are also significant contributors in the 1970s and 1980s even 
though only recently these factors are the subject of discussions. Our estimation results suggest 
that developing economies could hold lower levels of international reserves if they were to be 
perceived as developed ones. One interpretation is that, despite our relatively exhaustive list of 
explanatory variables, the fitted models do not fully capture the differences between these two 
groups of economies. Some possible omitted variables are market credibility and the level of 
sociopolitical governance. Unfortunately we do not have data on these variables. 
Furthermore, our results do not lend strong support to the assertion that economies 
including China, Japan, and Korea are hoarding an excessive amount of international reserves in 
the 2000s. Specifically, the predicted values generated from various estimated equations of 
international reserves do not indicate a large over-hoarding phenomenon. Instead, the models of 
the 1975 – 1981 and 1983 – 1993 vintages suggest that these economies should have higher 
levels of international reserves than their actual holding levels in the 2000s. We do identify one 
condition under which some developing economies display signs of excessive hoarding in the 
2000s – the use of models fitted to developed economies to generate the predicted level of 
international reserves.  
The continuing process of globalization and the growing importance of capital account 
transactions are likely to be the reasons for the changing relationship between international 
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reserves and their determinants. Understandably, the changing world economic environment 
makes the optimal level of international reserves a moving target. A corollary is that the 
assessment of the adequacy of international reserves is a non-trivial enterprise; especially in the 
periods that experience significant events in the international arena. Given the occurrence of 
dramatic events (both economic and geo-political ones) around the new millennium, it is 
reasonable to expect that the demand for international reserves will not be the same as it was in 
the past. Hence, the assertions of unusual or excessive hoarding of international reserves must be 




1. Data Appendix 
Table A.1 presents the list of the variables considered in the exercise. Only variables that are 
found to be statistically significant are reported in the text. The table also provides the definitions of 
these variables and the sources of the primary data used to construct these variables. These are annual 
data from 1975 to 2005. The sample of economies consists of 22 developed economies and 104 
developing economies. 
 
2. Period Averages of Some Selected Variables 
The period averages of the variables are reported in Table A.2. There are some obvious 
variations between developed and developing economies and across the three sample periods. While 
the two groups of economies have comparable levels of international reserves in the first two sample 
periods, there is a noticeable change in the 1999-2005 period. Since the Asian financial crisis, 
developing economies have accumulated a substantial amount of international reserves, averaging 
more than double that of developed economies. 
A few other observations are in order. First, among the developed economies, macroeconomic 
variables usually remain relatively stable across the three periods. The developing economies, on the 
other hand, experience variations in some variables. For example, both volatilities of international 
reserve holdings and export receipts decline over time, a sharp contrast with the developed 
economies. The opportunity cost of holding international reserves peaks for the developing 
economies in the 1983-1993 period – reflecting the debt crisis in the period – and reverts back to a 
lower level in the last period, though still much higher compared to the developed economies. 
Second, the financial variables exhibit some discernable differences between the two groups. 
The developed economies have a higher monetarization ratio, which is consistent with the perception 
that these economies have a higher degree of financial deepening and more advanced capital markets 
than the developing ones. The table shows that the group of developing economies is net receivers of 
external debt and FDI flows.25 Apparently, for developing economies, FDI flows are gaining 
importance recently while external debts peak in the 1983-1993 period.  
Third, by eyeballing institutional variables, we can confirm that developed economies have 
already achieved high levels of institutional development and democracy in early years. Developing 
                                                 
25  Positive (Negative) net external financial liabilities correspond to net receivers (provider) of external finances. 
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economies are on the catch-up trend, but still lagging behind the developed economies. It is 
worthwhile noting that the Chinn-Ito (2006, 2008) de jure index of financial openness suggests that 
countries have taken different paths of financial liberalization; the developed economies have 
constantly implemented financial liberalization since the 1970s while the developing economies 
restricted cross-border capital flows during the 1980s, though they rapidly reopened capital accounts 
after the mid-1990s (see Chinn and Ito, 2008). 
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Table A.1: Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
1. Dependent variables  
R_GDP total international reserves (including gold)/current GDP WDI 
2. Variables in “X” – “Macro variables” 
RYPC_US per capita GDP in constant US dollars WDI 
POP population  WDI 
PIMP propensity to import IFS 
RES_VOL international reserve volatility IFS 
DIFINT opportunity cost of holding international reserves WDI, IFS 
3. Variables in “Y” – “Financial variables” 
M2Y M2 to current GDP WDI, IFS 
NET_DEBT net debt liabilities / current GDP LM 
NET_FDI net FDI liabilities / current GDP LM 
NET_PORTFOLIO net portfolio equity liabilities / current GDP LM 
D_DEBT_LIAB growth rate of net debt liabilities / current GDP LM 
D_FDI_LIAB growth rate of net FDI liabilities / current GDP LM 
D_PORTFOLIO_LIAB growth rate of net portfolio liabilities / current GDP LM 
4. Variables in “Z” – “Institutional variables” 
KAOPEN capital account openness Chinn-Ito (2006) 
DEFACTO_FININT de facto financial openness  = (Total external assets + liabilities) / current GDP LM 
TRADEOPEN de jure trade openness WDI 
CORRUPT corruption [0, 6] ICRG 
BQ bureaucratic quality [0, 6] ICRG 
LAO law and Order [0, 6] ICRG 
LEFT dummy variable for left-wing government DPI2004 
PLURAL dummy variable for parliament with Plural electoral system DPI2004 
GOVFRAC government fractionalization [0, 1] DPI2004 
POLCONV political constraint (democracy) index Henisz (2000) 
5. Dummies (“D”)   
ER_CRAWL dummy variable for the crawling peg exchange rate regime RR 
ER_FIX dummy variable for the fixed exchange rate regime RR 
CRISIS dummy variable for a currency crisis Authors’ calculations 
BANKCRISIS dummy variable for a banking crisis CK 
OIL dummy variable for oil exporting countries Authors’ calculations 
NOTES: The source codes are: BDL: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, and Levine (2000, updated in later years); CI: 
Chinn and Ito (2006); CK: Caprio and Klingebiel (2003); DPI2004: Database of Political Institutions, Beck 
et al. (2001); Henisz: Henisz (2000); ICRG: International Country Risk Guide; IFS: IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics; IMF: Other IMF databases; LM: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006); Polity IV: Polity IV 
project (2004); RR: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002, updated up to 2004); and WDI: World Development 
Indicators. 
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